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TOWARD A SOCIAL CONCEPTION 
OF SOENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Gonzalo Munevar 
Department of Philosophy and Religion 
University of Nebraska at Omaha 
Omaha, Nebraska 68182 
This paper examines the consequences of Feyerabend's thesis 
against the notion of scientific method. It is claimed that he has a 
strong case. Comparisons are made with other contemporary philos-
ophers of science such as Kuhn and Lakatos. A result of the case against 
method is that science appears not to be a rational enterprise. This con-
clusion is resisted. Nevertheless, in order to show that the rationality 
of science is compatible with Feyerabend's thesis, it is necessary to 
switch from a conception that ascribes scientific rationality to the 
individual scientist to a conception in which rationality is ascribed only 
to the enterprise of science as a whole. Then, scientific rationality is a 
social, or perhaps structural, property and our science actually has it to 
a large extent. 
t t t 
The work of Kuhn (1970) and Feyerabend (1975 and 
1978) has challenged anew the thesis that science is a rational 
enterprise. The reaction has been swift, but the arguments so 
far advanced against Kuhn and Feyerabend are not very com-
pelling. On the other hand, what Feyerabend says is not in-
compatible with a rational picture of science. This paper 
develops such a picture. 
First, it is necessary to understand the nature of the case 
presented by Kuhn and Feyerabend. In philosophy of science 
circles, scientific methodology and rationality go hand in 
hand. There seems to be a plausible case for such a connection. 
Science has seemed to be a most successful enterprise, and it 
is not unreasonable that people would want to know the basis 
for that success. It was thought that science succeeded where 
other human enterprises failed because science proceeded dif-
ferently, because it had a method all its own. Determining the 
method acquired great importance, then, because by its 
rigorous application we could improve already existing science 
and extend science to new areas. 
According to this scheme, following the method would 
guarantee the success of science, or at least make such success 
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more likely-thus the connection between method and reason. 
To be rational in science, then, is identified with living up to 
the standards of scientific rationality, i.e., to follow method-
ological rules such as, "reject hypotheses that are in conflict 
with well confirmed hypotheses," "reject hypotheses that are 
in conflict with the facts," "do not make ad hoc moves," and 
the like. 
Of course, whether science could be shown to be rational 
has always been a favorite subject for skepticism. But Feyer-
abend's case is of a different sort. What he argued is that in 
paradigm cases of scientific success it seems that the relevant 
scientists did not follow the method. Furthermore, success 
did not come about in spite of the violation of the method 
(e.g., by luck, shortcuts, etc.), but rather it required that 
very violation. Feyerabend's argument against method, and 
hence against rationality, is a reductio: 
1. Success is the justification for adhering to scientific 
rationality. 
2. But, rationality actually gets in the way of success. 
3. Thus, rationality and success are incompatible. 
Feyerabend need not have any particular stake on wheth-
er science is actually successful, and he does not have to 
believe in the sanctity of argument or in the evidential tech-
niques that he uses in historical analyses. He simply plays the 
rationalist game, accepts the rationalist starting position for 
the sake of argument, and then shows that no methodological 
rule can be excluded from violation, that from the point of 
view of the rationalist, "anything goes." It seems then that 
anarchy has reigned in science, and that it ought to reign if 
science is to progress. 
There have been so many misunderstandings on this score 
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that the main points bear emphasizing. First, Feyerabend 
made no claim "to possess special knowledge about what is 
good and what is bad in the sciences." According to him: 
Everyone can read the terms in his own way and in 
accordance with the tradition to which he belongs. 
Thus for an empiricist "progress" will mean transition 
to a theory that provides direct empirical tests for 
most of its basic assumptions .... For others, "prog-
ress" may mean unification and harmony, perhaps 
even at the expense of empirical adequacy .... And 
my thesis is that anarchism helps achieve progress in 
anyone of the senses one cares to choose (Feyera-
bend, 1975). 
Second, it is a simple point of elementary logic that when 
giving a reductio ad absurdum one need not be committed 
to the truth of the assumptions one accepts for the sake of 
argument. Thus Feyerabend (1975) said, 
Always remember that the demonstrations and the 
rhetorics used do not express any "deep convictions" 
of mine. They merely show how easy it is to lead 
people by the nose in a rational way. An anarchist is 
like an undercover agent who plays the game of 
Reason in order to undercut the authority of Reason 
(Truth, Honesty, Justice, and so on). 
Third, Anything Goes is not really offered as method-
ological principle. It is rather a description of what things look 
like from the rationalist perspective after the force of Feyera-
bend's arguments is recognized. Feyerabend(1975) is clear on 
this matter: 
One might get the impression that I recommend a 
new methodology which replaces induction by 
counterinduction and uses a multiplicity of theories, 
metaphysical views, fairy-tales instead of the cus-
tomary pair theory/observation. This impression 
would certainly be mistaken. My intention is not to 
replace one set of general rules by another such set: 
my intention is, rather, to convince the reader that all 
methodologies, even the most obvious ones, have 
their limits. The best way to show this is to demon-
strate the limits and even the irrationality of some 
rules that she, or he, is likely to regard as basic. 
Feyerabend's demonstrations consist of historical exami-
nations and epistemological analysis of the relation between 
idea and action. For every "basic" methodological rule of em-
piricism he claimed that he could show that a "counterrule" 
may be preferred. He suggested, for example, a counterrule 
which "advises us to introduce and elaborate hypotheses 
which are inconsistent with well-established theories and/or 
well-established facts. It advises us to proceed counterinduc-
tively" (Feyerabend, 1975). 
In favor of his counterrule, Feyerabend argued that the 
evidence to refute a theory is often unearthed only with the 
help of incompatible alternatives. As for facts, observations, 
and experimental results, they all contain theoretical assump-
tions, or assert them by the manner of their use. But, those 
assumptions which shape our view of the world are often not 
accessible to direct criticism, for usually we are not even aware 
of them. Prejudices, then, are found by contrast, not by analy-
sis. " ... we need a dream world," Feyerabend said, "in order 
to discover the features of the real world we think we inhabit 
(and which may actually be just another dream-world)." But 
the invention of this dream world designed to clash with our 
well established views, experimental results, and so on, is a 
counterinductive step. "Counterinduction is therefore always 
reasonable and has always a chance of success" (Feyerabend, 
1975). 
The history of science can be used to illustrate Feyera-
bend's sort of epistemological analysis. Consider the following 
two examples. At the beginning of last century Prout (see 
Lakatos, 1970) suggested that atomic weights should be ex-
pressed by whole numbers (since they were all multiples of the 
atomic weight of hydrogen). Unfortunately there were clear 
exceptions. The atomic weight of chlorine, for instance, was 
35.6. Such was the result obtained from samples of "pure" 
Cl by the best practitioners of the science. There was no ob-
servational error and there was nothing really at fault with the 
purification techniques. More and better measurements would 
not have led to the conclusion (which would be favored today) 
that Prout was correct in spite of what seemed to be a clear 
refutation of his hypothesis. What was required instead was 
the development of a very different view of nature: modern 
atomic theory, and especially the notion of isotopes. As it 
turned out, the "pure" samples of Cl contained two isotopes 
of the element (of course, that is still pure Cl, for it is not 
mixed with other elements). The measured weight was that of 
the mix of the two isotopes. 
Another case, which Feyerabend (1975) discussed in great 
detail, is that of Galileo. Let us concentrate on the Tower 
Argument. If a stone is dropped from the top of a high tower, 
the stone will hit the ground at approximately the same dis-
tance from the base of the tower as it was from the top of the 
tower at the initial moment of descent. Anyone can see that 
the stone moves straight down. This motion was taken as a 
refutation of the view that the earth moved. If the earth 
moves, the tower should have moved a considerable distance 
by the time the stone hit the ground. But, the distance be-
tween stone and tower remains the same. Or else, the stone 
must have fallen diagonally, but this is plainly not so. Thus, 
the earth cannot be in motion. Once again, what was required 
to overcome arguments such as this, was a new way of inter-
preting the phenomena, a set of "natural interpretations" 
that already assumes that the earth moves. Galileo challenged 
the concept of motion as observed motion. Some motion goes 
unobserved, he said, because it is shared by the observer. In 
the case of the Tower Argument, the stone only seems to 
move straight down. The real motion of the stone is a com-
bination of circular inertia-which is shared by the earth, the 
tower, the stone, and the observer-and a perpendicular mo-
tion toward the center of the earth. The stone did really move 
as it had appeared ridiculous to suppose. (Not only did Galileo 
apply the counterrule, he saved the day by making a further 
and ad hoc hypothesis: circular inertia.) 
In both of these cases, as well as in many other crucial 
episodes in the history of science, the inductive rules of the 
so-called scientific method would have favored the received 
view. The moral is that work in alternative and even bizarre 
views should not be discouraged [that what Feyerabend 
(l975) called the "principle of proliferation" cannot be ruled 
out] . 
The principle of proliferation is perhaps the most impor-
tant point where Kuhn and Feyerabend lock heads. They both 
would have agreed that there is no method, but Kuhn viewed 
the history of science as a series of periods ("normal science") 
in which the scientific community is totally committed to a 
single point of view (what he called a "paradigm"). During 
revolutionary periods, paradigms are overthrown and replaced 
by new ones which enjoy the same total commitment from the 
scientific community. Revolutions are brought about only by 
crises, and these in turn are caused by recalcitrant and signifi-
cant anomalies (Kuhn, 1970). But as Feyerabend (l970) 
pointed out, no anomaly is more significant than one ex-
plained within an alternative view. Feyerabend realized, how-
ever, that Kuhn had a point when he insisted that a view needs 
time and commitment before its worth can be realized. This 
means that practitioners may decide to continue work on a 
view that may have had some of its predictions falsified, that 
they may simply choose to put the falsifying instances on the 
back burner. This Feyerabend (l970) called the "principle 
of tenacity." Such a principle is most reasonable, for, as 
Kuhn (l970) argued, all theories are always besieged by anom-
alies, but anomalies do not become counterevidence until 
they are assimilated within a competing theory (or paradigm). 
In F eyerabend's (l975) account there is intense competi-
tion among alternative views. But, even those that come worse 
off in the struggle need not be abandoned. They may still 
make a comeback (as the atomism and the heliocentric view of 
the cosmos did), and even if they do not they may still per-
form a valuable service to science. Thus, progress in science 
permits (indeed requires) sticking to a view in the face of con-
flicting evidence as well as proliferation of views. Science 
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should then be an interplay of the principles of tenacity and 
proliferation. Unfortunately, from the point of view of the 
rationalist such an account of science rules out nothing-if 
it is correct then anything goes. But if there is no scientific 
method, there is no scientific rationality either. 
Some rationalists have offered a different approach to 
methodology. Lakatos (l970), for example, tried to allow for 
the principles of tenacity and proliferation, while still insisting 
that some activities are more proper (i. e., rational) than others. 
The unit of evaluation is a series of theories (a research pro-
gram) which changes under the heat generated by competing 
theories (principle of proliferation). Such changes constitute a 
progressive problem-shift if they lead to an increase in con-
tent. If the changes do not anticipate new facts but instead 
serve only to assimilate the new discoveries of the competi-
tion (thus being ad hoc), the program is said to be degener-
ating. A program, however, may degenerate for a long time 
and still make a comeback (principle of tenacity). As promis-
ing as this approach may sound, it has several problems. The 
main one, in the context of the present discussion, is that 
there is no time limit, nor can there be, that would force 
abandonment of a degenerating research program. But then 
nothing can be ruled out. In that case Lakatos' and Feyera-
bend's approaches will not be all that different after all, no 
matter how many rationalist garments Lakatos may wear. 
Thus, it seems that no rescue awaits rationality down this 
avenue of thought either. 
Must it be concluded, then, that Feyerabend was correct, 
that science cannot be both rational and successful? As often 
happens in philosophical controversies, both sides share some 
crucial assumptions. In this particular controversy it is as-
sumed that scientific rationality depends on the individual 
scientist's adherence to method. The issue of rationality is 
thus resolved, as Feyerabend did, by looking at the behavior 
of scientists in the light of certain theoretical (e.g., epistemo-
logical) considerations. But is such a manner of resolution 
correct and is such an assumption warranted? The answer to 
both questions is no. 
Why should the question of the rationality of science be 
considered equivalent to that of the rationality of individual 
scientists? After all, the question whether a particular basket-
ball team is good is not settled by determining whether the 
individual members of the team are good players. To do so 
would be to commit the fallacy of composition. The quality 
of the team is determined instead by whether the players 
exhibit certain relations to one another on the court. It is, in 
a sense, a social property. It may, perhaps, also be called an 
organizational or structural property. Now, science may not 
seem to be an organic whole, unlike a basketball team. None-
theless science is a communal enterprise, not only for those 
who work as members of research teams, but also for those 
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who would be described as lone investigators. Even the latter 
form part of a community that shares certain ideas and goals, 
though perhaps only in an overlapping manner, and who de-
pend on others for the generation and judgment of most, if 
not all, of the new ideas that become part of their intellectual 
environment. It is in that communally generated environment 
that even individual genius must endure or perish (of course, 
survival of some ideas may lead to the transformation of the 
intellectual environment)_ In any event, the enterprise of 
science is very complex and, as a result, requires division of 
labor-no scientist can do it all alone. In this division oflabor 
and in the relation to the aims of science, a new conception 
of scientific rationality may be glimpsed: a conception that 
treats rationality as a social or structural property of the 
scientific enterprise. 
The intention here is to sketch a social conception of 
scientific rationality. Both the need and the plausibility of 
such a sketch arise from certain recent developments in the 
philosophy of science, most notably Feyerabend's work. So 
it is natural that the highlights of this sketch are designed to 
take care of Feyerabend's strongest criticisms against ration-
ality. The intent is to show, then, not that scientific rationality 
must be conceived in social terms, but rather that it need not 
be concluded that the sort of case that Feyerabend developed 
is incompatible with the claim that science is a rational enter-
prise. 
If science is structured in such away, if its division of 
labor is such that it leads to progress (as exemplified in Feyera-
bend's kind of cases), then science is rational-or at least, the 
rationality of science is compatible with Feyerabend's posi-
tion. 
Science is a communal enterprise which tries to gain 
knowledge about the world. Science tries to give pictures of 
the world that allow us to make sense of it, to know what to 
expect of it, and to know how to deal with it. Such a com-
munal enterprise would be rational if it developed appropriate 
strategies to enhance its chances of carrying out its task. 
Science would be rational, then, if it were organized (struc-
tured) so as to make success more easily achieved. 
Now, in a universe of immense variety it would be sur-
prising if the first ideas we ever came up with would be fruitful 
to explain all there is. The same point can be made about 
methods. New ideas, new methods will enable us to deal with 
new areas of the universe, or else permit us to confront chang-
ing circumstances. On the other hand, many ideas have much 
to offer in dealing with the world if we only give ourselves the 
chance to develop them. Thus, the communal enterprise which 
aims to gain knowledge is well advised to organize itself so as 
to ensure, or at least encourage, the generation of alternatives 
(but what is this if not the principle of proliferation?) and 
to permit people to develop their ideas even in the face of 
damaging evidence (but what is this if not the principle of 
tenacity?). 
The interplay of these two principles leads to a society 
of researchers in which people do what they like best, in which 
they develop those views of nature that for any reason have 
caught their fancy. At the same time, the quality of work 
improves when strong challenge points the way in the direc-
tions that could use improvement. Such a society is appro-
priately organized to face the surprises, to search for the secret 
treasures our diverse universe has in store for an intelligent 
species. But what is this society, this communal enterprise, 
if not science as Feyerabend described it? 
Rationality may still be the key to progress, then, but not 
the so-called rationality of the individual scientist, but the 
rationality of the scientific enterprise as a whole. It does not 
matter then that individual scientists either stick to their ini-
tial view, no matter what; or that they are always looking for 
alternatives and never stick to one point of view; or that they 
hold on to the most successful view of their time and look 
down upon all others; or that they rave against the received 
view, violate method, and perhaps even become historical 
figures thanks to that. In other words, it does not matter 
whether the individual scientist is dogmatic or anarchistic, as 
long as science itself permits the operation of the principles 
of proliferation and tenacity. 
The point can be illustrated by drawing an analogy to 
Feyerabend's own political philosophy. A free society is 
normally envisioned as the sort of society in which different 
individuals are able to express different opinions and, in gen-
eral, pursue the life-styles that they favor. In this Feyerabend 
very much followed Mill (1956). Such a society, moreover, 
does not cease being free because some, or even many, of its 
citizens are not open-minded, or because they think poorly of 
their fellows' ideas and life-styles. The society is free because 
the individuals do not interfere with their fellows' pursuits, no 
matter what they think of them, either because there is a ten-
dency to live and let live, or because they fear the arm of the 
law if they so interfere. Freedom is a structural property that 
some societies have, then, Feyerabend claimed. It functions 
like an iron railing on the entire society (Feyerabend, 1978). 
Likewise, rationality functions like an iron railing. It is a 
structural property that some knowledge-gathering enterprises 
may have. Science, as described by Feyerabend, actually has it 
to a large extent. So, science, to a large extent, is rational. 
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